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Abstract
We consider a committee that makes a decision on a project on behalf of ‘the
public’. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project,
and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are ex-
perts who care both about the value of the project and about being considered
well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their pri-
vate information simultaneously (so no herding). We show that reputational
concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead
committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether
information can be manipulated or not. Next, we show that reputational
concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if
their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the de-
cisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality
of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter
with those of the public.
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1 Introduction
Many important decisions are made by committees. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System and the Governing Council of
the European Central Bank decide on monetary policy. Important national policy
decisions are made by the Council of Ministers and not by a single minister. Com-
mittees also play an important role in parliaments. In the European Parliament,
there are 17 committees dealing with internal policies (e.g. the Committee on Bud-
gets or the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy), and three committees
dealing with external policies (e.g. the Committee on Development). The health
care profession makes extensive use of expert consensus panels. Decisions in business
are made by, e.g., management teams, audit committees and boards of governors.
Tenure and promotion decisions in, e.g., academia and law firms are typically made
by committees.
Compared to individual decision-making, committee decision-making benefits
from the possibility of information exchange and discussion before a decision is
reached. Potentially, decisions taken by a committee are therefore based on more
or better information than decisions taken by a single individual. We use the word
"potentially" for two reasons. First, when information is endogenous, committee
decision-making suffers from a free-rider problem. As a result, individual committee
members may put insufficient effort in acquiring information (see Mukhopadhaya,
2003, and Persico, 2000). The second reason is perhaps less known to economists
than the first one, but possibly as important. Students of group decisions have
frequently found that members of committees are reluctant to openly express their
opinions.1 In particular, members of groups often feel a pressure to conform.
Concurrence-seeking tendencies may explain instances of committee decision-
making resulting in poor performance. Interesting in this respect is the work by
Janis (1972), who described several failures in U.S. policy decision-making after the
Second World War. Most famous is his analysis of the decision by the Kennedy
administration to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. In late 1960, the CIA conceived
the plan to place a brigade of Cuban exiles on the coast of Cuba with the ultimate
aim of bringing down the government. The group that later approved the plan
1See, e.g., Gouran and Hirokawa (1996) and Hirokawa et al (1996).
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consisted of President Kennedy, some members of his cabinet, two CIA officials and
a number of White House staff. What has surprised students of this case was the
fact that the CIA officials were able to paint too rosy a picture of the chances of
success, and that this depiction of reality went by and large unquestioned. Although
various members of the group had serious reservations about the plan, these were
either not aired or were easily challenged by the CIA promoters of the plan. A
couple of days after the brigade invaded Cuba, the plan turned out to be a "perfect
failure". Janis makes it quite clear that the reason for this failure was not lack of
information. The reason was incomplete disclosure of available information.
In this paper we present a model that explains a number of phenomena as the
result of committee members’ desire to be perceived as able decision—makers. These
phenomena include, first, the desire of a committee to show a united front; second,
the attractiveness of the a priori unlikely decision; third, the tendency to present
manipulated information that favours this decision by some members of the com-
mittee; and fourth the acceptance of this risky undertaking in the presence of strong
personal doubts by others.
In our model, a committee of experts has to decide on behalf of the public (or
an organization) whether to implement a project or to maintain the status quo.
The problem is that the consequences of the project are uncertain. Concerning the
project, members have common preferences. However, each member has a private
view of the consequences of the project. The more likely it is that someone is
competent, the more likely it becomes that a member’s view provides an accurate
picture of the consequence of the project. A member does not know whether he is
competent or not, only that he is competent with a certain probability.
A distinguishing feature of our model is that committee members are concerned
with the way the decision reached reflects upon their decision-making ability. Be-
cause of, e.g., career concerns, peer pressure, or adherence to internalized profes-
sional standards, committee members want to be perceived as being competent.
The presence of reputational concerns in committees is illustrated by the following
quote from Lawrence Roos, a former president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank and member of the FOMC: “If one is a young, career-oriented president who’s
got a family to feed, he tends to be more moderate in his opposition to governors”
(Greider 1988, p. 205). This quote also suggests that committee members may care
2
about their reputation to different extents. For this reason, we allow that some
members care more about their reputation than others.
The committee reaches a decision in two stages. In the first stage, the communi-
cation stage, each member can share his privately held view with the other members.
We assume that members simultaneously reveal their views. This amounts to as-
suming that speeches are prepared in advance. In the second stage, the voting stage,
members casts their votes simultaneously, and votes are aggregated using some vot-
ing rule (unanimity or other majority rules).2 After the committee has arrived at a
decision, the ‘market’, the people whose judgment committee members care about,
forms a belief about the competence levels of committee members. We assume that
the market does not observe the value of the project, only the decision taken. This
assumption lacks realism in some situations, like the ones discussed in Janis (1972),
but not in others. Gabel and Shipan (2004, 544), e.g., while on the topic of compar-
ing the quality of expert panel decision—making with individual decision—making in
the health care profession, point out that “we would need to know the correct treat-
ment decision before we could empirically evaluate the accuracy and performance
of expert panels in prescribing treatments”. Such knowledge is typically hard to
get: “Indeed, expert panels exist precisely because of the absence of clear empirical
guidance” (emphasis in original)
We derive four main results. First, as soon as members care about their reputa-
tion, they want to speak with one voice. Disagreement signals lack of competence
as competent members view the consequences of the project in the same way. Both
the proponents and the opponents of the final decision have an interest in forming
a unified front once the decision has been taken. Schultz, a former Governor and
Vice-Chairman of the FOMC states it succinctly: “We should argue in the Board
meetings but close ranks in public” (Greider 1988, p. 390). Our first result is consis-
tent with the observation made by Chappell et al (2003) that disagreements within
the FOMC do not show up in voting records. Illustrative is their finding that the
number of dissenting votes on policy directives is rather small, only 8% of all votes
in the period 1966-1996.3
2We therefore exclude any discussion of the well-known phenomenon of herding. Our findings
show that reputational concerns matter even if members of a group take decisions simultaneously.
3Sometimes, members publicly state their disagreement. We provide various explanations in
Section 8.
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Our second result is that reputational concerns may distort the project imple-
mentation decision. The reason for this result is that the eventual decision on the
project affects members’ reputations, and that therefore one decision is more at-
tractive than another from a reputational perspective. To understand why, suppose
that it is socially optimal to implement the project only if all committee members
privately hold the view that the project is good. With such a decision rule, im-
plementation of the project implies that the members’ views concur. This is good
for the committee members’ reputations. However, as status quo may be the result
of disagreement among the committee members, maintaining the status quo dam-
ages the members’ reputations. Hence, in this situation, reputational concerns give
incentives to the committee members to choose implementation even when main-
taining status quo would be socially optimal. The stronger is the desire to come
across as a competent decision-maker, the stronger is the incentive to distort the
implementation decision.
Third, as members differ in the extent to which they care about their reputations,
some members may see their attempts to influence the implementation decision in
the voting stage frustrated. This may keep them from revealing private information
truthfully in the communication stage. Suppose, for example, that implementation
of the project boosts the committee members’ reputations. Then, reputational con-
cerns give incentives to committee members to paint too rosy a picture of the project
and to exaggerate its benefits. Committee members may even become completely
uncritical in which event their statements will be ignored. We show that the mem-
bers who are most concerned with their reputations have the strongest incentives to
downplay negative information and present positive information instead. This result
reminds us of the decision on the Cuban invasion plan. In the advisory committee
on this plan, the two CIA officials were especially active advocates of the plan. In
the light of our model this is hardly surprising. As these members had been involved
in developing the project, their reputations were particularly at stake. The other
members of the committee were less committed to the CIA plan. However, since
the group was quite new - President Kennedy had only been in office for a couple of
months - members may well have considered the effect of their behaviour on the way
they were viewed by other members, in particular President Kennedy. For example,
Janis found that suppressing of personal doubts was the rule in the Committee on
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the Cuban invasion plan. Illustrative of his finding is the following quote "in his
account of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Schlesinger admits that he hesitated to bring up
his objections while attending the White House meetings for fear that others would
regard it is presumptuous for him, a college professor, to take issue with august
heads of major government institutions." (Janis, 1972, p. 32).
The final result deals with the influence the voting rule has on the implementation
decision. In case information cannot be manipulated, to protect the public from the
negative consequence of reputational concerns, one should make the person who is
the least interested in his reputation decisive. This can be guaranteed by imposing
unanimity rule. In case information can be manipulated the choice of voting rule
should balance the benefits from information exchange between members before
votes are cast and the costs of making a member decisive whose interests are less
aligned with those of the organization than the interests of some other member.
In the absence of reputational concerns, the voting rule would be immaterial. In
that case, no one is willing to sacrifice project payoff for a strengthened reputation.
Hence, once all private information has been shared, all members agree on the
decision on the project (see Coughlan, 2000, and Gerardi and Yariv, 2003).
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 presents a two persons version of our model. In Sections 4—6, we analyze
this model. In Section 7 we show how our results extend to committees consisting
of more than two persons. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on committee decision-making. Gerling et
al (2004) provide a recent survey of this literature. In this section, we do not repeat
their work. Instead, we discuss a limited number of studies in order to illuminate
how our main findings are related to previous results.
Quite a few studies deal with committee decision making as trial by a jury.
Decision makers (jurors) have private information about the state of nature (whether
the accussed person is guilty or innocent), and have to make a decision (convict or
acquit the defendant). Their goal is to avoid making the wrong decision (convicting
the innocent or acquiting the guilty). The decision is reached using some voting
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rule. Concerning the optimal organization of the jury, two questions are frequently
addressed. First, what is the optimal size of the jury (e.g., Mukhopadhaya, 2003
and Persico, 2004)? Second, what is the optimal voting rule (e.g., Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998, Ladha, 1992 and Young, 1988)?
Our model differs from the above models in two important respects. First, we as-
sume that communication among decision makers is possible before votes are cast.
Coughlan (2000) was one of the first who showed the importance of communica-
tion. His model extends the Feddersen and Pesendorfer model to allow for limited
communication among jurors. In particular, he assumes that the jury takes a non—
binding preliminary vote before taking the final binding vote. Coughlin shows that
an equilibrium exists in which each juror reveals his signal in the straw vote. The im-
plication is that in the final vote, jurors have no incentives to vote strategically. More
generally, Gerardi and Yariv (2003) argue that communication among jurors with
identical preferences renders voting rules equivalent. When information is shared,
either all jurors agree that the defendant is guilty or agree that the defendant is
not guilty. The results derived by Feddersen and Pesendorfer that unanimous jury
verdicts leads to strategic voting and implies a higher probability of convicting the
innocent than simple majority rule therefore rest on the assumption that jurors
cannot share information.
The second difference is that we model decision makers as experts who care
about their perceived decision—making ability. This assumption is plausible when
committee members are selected because of their expertise as is typically the case
for the committees mentioned in the introduction. Jurors are not a good example.
They are usually laymen whose professional reputations do not depend on how well
they are perceived as jurors.4
The result obtained by Gerardi and Yariv also applies to our model: if members
of the committee care to the same degree about their reputation, information can
be shared and the voting rule is immaterial. Li et al. (2001) show that conflicts of
interest limit the possibility of communication (see also Beniers and Swank, 2004). In
fact, Li et al. argue that conflicts of interest provide a rationale for the existence of a
voting procedure. When committee members are concerned with their reputation to
4Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) also model committee members as decision makers who care
about their reputation. In their model, members state their opinion publicly in turn.
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various degrees, reputational concerns may lead to conflicts of interest. Our finding
that reputational concerns may lead to manipulation of information and renders the
voting rule important is in line with Li et al. Our analysis in section 7 shows how the
choice of voting rule, by identifying the member whose vote is decisive, influences
the extent of information exchange in the communication stage.
As emphasized before, in our model committee members are concerned with
their reputation. Reputational concerns play an important role in the herding lit-
erature (see Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, for one of the seminal contributions, and
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) for an application to committee decision making). A
distinguishing feature of the herding literature is the sequential nature of decisions
and the manipulability of private information. Herding exists if the second player
in order mimics the first player by claiming he holds the same private information
as revealed by the first player’s decision. The incentive to mimic stems from the
fact that the second player does not want to let the public know that he disagrees
with the first player. Our model deviates from the herding literature in that agents
act simultaneously rather than sequentially. Accordingly, mimicking cannot take
place. Moreover, in our model it may be the case that information cannot be ma-
nipulated. This does not mean that reputational concerns do not play a role. As
some decisions require more concurrence than other decisions, some decisions are
better for the agents’ reputations than other decisions. Reputational concerns in-
crease the likelihood that committee members choose the unconventional, i.e., the
a priori unlikely decision. 5
There is a related literature about the desirability of transparency in committee
decision making. One argument for transparency is that it enables the public to
judge whether officials are acting in its interest (see for example Gersbach and
Hahn, 2004). We do not intend to contribute to this literature in the present paper,
other than by observing that transparency may strengthen committee members’
incentives to shy away from showing differences in opinion (see also Meade and
Stasavage, 2004).
5Milbourn et al. (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004) analyse how reputational concerns influence
the implementation decision in a single agent setting.
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3 The Model
On behalf of the public (or an organization), a committee of two members, 1 and
2, must make a decision whether to implement a project, denoted X = 1, or to
maintain the status quo, denoted X = 0. By normalization, status quo delivers a
payoff equal to zero. If implemented, the project yields a payoff to each member
(and the public) equal to p + µ. The parameter p is the expected payoff of the
project. The stochastic term µ captures that the consequences of the project are
uncertain. We assume that µ ∈ {−u, u}, with equal prior probability. Moreover,
we assume that (i) p < 0, implying that without further information about µ the
status quo should be maintained; (ii) p + u > 0, implying that the proper decision
on the project depends on value of the stochastic term.
At the beginning of the game, each member possesses a private signal about µ,
si ∈ Si =
©
sb, sg
ª
, i = 1, 2. A signal refers to a member’s assessment of µ (b is bad
and g is good). Whether this signal is informative depends on a member’s type, ti.
Each member can be smart or dumb, ti ∈ {sm, du}. The prior probability that a
member is smart equals π. A smart member has a fully informative signal about µ.
His opinion of µ is flawless, Pr (µ = u | sg, sm) = Pr ¡µ = −u | sb, sm¢ = 1. A dumb
member receives an uninformative signal: Pr (µ = u | sg, du) = Pr ¡µ = u | sb, du¢ =
1
2
. He does not learn anything new about the expected value of the project. A
member does not know his own competence, only the probability with which he is
smart, π. The ex ante probabilities of µ, and the prior probability π are common
knowledge.
The decision on the project is made in two stages. In the first stage, the commu-
nication stage, member i = {1, 2} sends a message, mi ∈ Mi =
©
mb,mg
ª
. By this
we mean that a member presents an analysis of µ. This may or may not reflect his
true assessment. In the second stage, the voting stage, the messages sent are com-
mon knowledge, and the members vote on the project, vi ∈
©
vb, vg
ª
, where vi = vb
(vi = vg) denotes that i votes against (for) the project. The relationship between
the individual votes cast and the decision on the project is determined by the voting
rule. We start our analysis by assuming that implementation of the project requires
that both members vote for the project, v1 = v2 = vg. In section 6, we show that
the assumption p < 0 implies that unanimity is the socially optimal voting rule in
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case of two members.
We assume that messages are sent simultaneously, and that votes are cast si-
multaneously. We make this assumption for two reasons. First, in some committees
the statements presented are typically prepared before the meeting takes place. For
example, governors, directors, and FED staff come to the FOMC meeting with their
analyses prepared. Second, by excluding sequential decision making in either stage
we can avoid a discussion of the well-known phenomenon of herding. Our analysis
shows that reputational concerns may lead to socially undesirable outcomes even in
the absence of sequential decision making.
Apart from project payoffs, a member is concerned with his perceived level of
competence. We refer to this as his reputation. It is defined as the belief the ‘market’
holds that a member is smart once a decision on the project has been made. We
assume that when forming its beliefs, the ‘market’ does not observe µ. Specifically,
member i’s preferences are represented by
Ui (X = 1) = p+ µ+ λibπ (X = 1) (1)
Ui (X = 0) = λibπ (X = 0)
where λi denotes the relative weight member i attributes to his reputation, andbπ (X = x) = Pr (ti = sm|X = x) is the posterior probability that member i is smart,
conditional on the decision on X = x. Committee members have homogenous
preferences as to the project, but differ in the weight they give to their reputation,
λ1 < λ2. These weights are common knowledge.
We make an assumption to ensure that in expected terms, and in the absence
of reputational concerns, committee decision making yields better decisions than
decision making by a single individual. In particular, we assume that if one member
has received a positive signal, then the optimal decision on the project depends on
the signal received by the other member. As members are equally smart, one pos-
itive and one negative signal cancel each other out, p + E
¡
µ | s1 = sg, s2 = sb
¢
=
p. As p < 0, the project should be rejected. Therefore, to ensure that com-
mittee decision—making improves upon individual decision—making we assume p +
E (µ | s1 = sg, s2 = sg) > 0.
Assumption 1 In the absence of reputational concerns, committee decision making
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yields better decisions than individual decision making, p+E (µ | s1 = sg, s2 = sg) >
0.
This assumption implies that from the organization’s point of view, the project
should be implemented if and only if both members receive a positive signal. We
refer to a situation in which the committee choosesX = 1 if and only if the signal set
equals (s1, s2) = (sg, sg) as a situation in which a first-best decision rule is followed.
Notice that we use (1) with λi = 0 as the public’s payoff function.
We conclude this section with a note on equilibria. As the messages sent become
common knowledge before members vote, we use subgame perfection. As is common
in voting games, if X = 1 requires a majority of favourable votes, it is always an
equilibrium for all members to vote against implementation, independent of the
signals received and the messages sent. We ignore such equilibria. Moreover, we
assume that if a member decides to reveal his private information he uses a natural
language (mg if sg, and mb if sb), rather than the inverted language. We also
ignore babbling equilibria if information can be manipulated, and focus instead
on equilibria in which as much information is exchanged given the interests of the
members.
4 Information cannot be manipulated
We begin by analysing the case in which a member is only able to truthfully reveal
his private signal. This means that a member is unable either to paint too rosy
a picture of the circumstances determining the project’s value or to intentionally
understate the project’s likely benefits. We start our analysis in this way for two
reasons. First, it may be a realistic case. The impossibility of manipulating in-
formation may result from the fact that other members ask pertinent and probing
questions. As these members are experts, claims will be verifiable at least to some
extent, in the sense that a member cannot claim everything. The underlying idea
is that, as in Dewatripont and Tirole (2004), (investment in) communication may
make information hard. The other reason to start the analysis by assuming that in-
formation is truthfully revealed is that the ensuing analysis suggests which member
has an incentive to manipulate information and in which situation.
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4.1 Equilibrium
We begin by identifying the conditions under which the first-best decision rule is an
equilibrium outcome of the game. We next characterize the equilibrium outcome
in case this decision rule is not an equilibrium outcome. Initially, we assume that
members speak with one voice, meaning that the public cannot infer any information
about the quality of the members from their public statements regarding their pri-
vately held views or the votes cast. The public can therefore only infer information
from the decision on the project. In Section 6.1, we show that committee members
who care about their reputation want to speak with one voice.
If members vote favourably only if (s1, s2) = (sg, sg), the first-best decision is
the equilibrium outcome, and posterior beliefs are:6
bπ (X = 1) = 1 + π
1 + π2
π > π
bπ (X = 0) = 3− π
3− π2π < π (2)
If the first-best decision rule is followed, implementation yields a higher reputation
than maintaining the status quo. The reason is that with this decision rule, the
public can infer from implementation that both members have received the same
(positive) signal, whereas the decision to maintain the status quo may have resulted
from either two concurring (negative) signals, or from two conflicting ones. As smart
members receive identical signals, conflicting signals are a unequivocal sign that at
least one member is dumb.
As signals are not manipulated, we only have to determine which votes are
cast for given signal sets. Suppose that both members have presented positive
information, s1 = s2 = sg, and suppose the public holds the posterior beliefs given
in (2). Then, both members prefer implementation to maintaining the status quo,
vi = v
g, i = 1, 2, because the expected project payoff is positive by assumption 1
and because implementation strengthens their reputations.
If instead one or both of the signals is negative, implementation would be bad
from a project point of view but beneficial from a reputational point of view. This
suggests that with strong enough reputational concerns, the first-best decision rule
6The derivation can be found in the proof of proposition 1.
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is not an equilibrium outcome of our game. Because implementation requires that
both members vote favourably, both members have to be willing to cast a favourable
vote for a deviation from the first-best decision rule to occur. Obviously, member
1, who cares less about his reputation than member 2, is less inclined to sacrifice
project payoff for a strengthened reputation. If he is willing to implement the project
for a given signal set, then so is member 2. This implies that member 1 is decisive.
If member 1 is not inclined to vote favourably in case of one negative signal,
then he will certainly refrain from casting a favourable vote in case of two negative
signals–the expected project loss would be even larger, whereas the gain in repu-
tation would be left unaffected. The next proposition states the maximum degree
to which member 1 may care about his reputation such that the committee uses the
first-best decision rule.
Proposition 1 Suppose that members do not manipulate information, and that the
voting rule is unanimity. Then the first-best decision rule (implement if and only if
s1 = s2 = s
g) is an equilibrium outcome if and only if
λ1 ≤ λ :=
−pbπ (X = 1)− bπ (X = 0)
If the first-best decision rule is not an equilibrium outcome, what is the equilib-
rium outcome? It is easy to verify that implementing the project if the signal set is
(s1, s2) =
©
(sg, sg) ,
¡
sb, sg
¢
,
¡
sg, sb
¢ª
cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Such a de-
cision rule would imply a larger degree of signal concurrence in case of rejection than
in case of implementation, and therefore that bπ (X = 0) > bπ (X = 1). With such
posterior beliefs, either member would vote against the project when the signals are
conflicting. This suggests that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists such that,
in case of conflicting signals, the committee sometimes does and sometimes does not
implement the project. Suppose that member 1 votes favourably if both signals are
positive; votes favourably with probability β1 in case of conflicting signals, s1 6= s2;
and votes against if both signals are negative. As member 1 is indifferent when he
mixes, member 2, who cares more about his reputation, must have a strict preference
for voting favourably. Moreover, if member 1 is against implementation, member
2 may still favour implementation. Unanimity, however, guarantees that member
1’s vote is decisive. A weakly dominant strategy for member 2 is therefore to vote
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favourably unless both signals are negative.7
With the postulated members’ strategies, the posterior probabilities are8
bπ (X = 1; β1) = (1 + π) + 2 (1− π)β1(1 + π2) + (1− π2)β1πbπ (X = 0; β1) = 3− π − 2 (1− π) β13− π2 − 2 (1− π2) β1π (3)
As member 1 mixes in case of two conflicting signals, he is indifferent between
implementation and maintaining the status quo, implying that β1 is determined by:
p+ λ1bπ (X = 1;β1) = λ1bπ (X = 0; β1) (4)
With p < 0, we have that bπ (X = 1;β1) > bπ (X = 0; β1) in equilibrium. This im-
plies that the probability with which member 1 votes favourably (and hence the
probability with which the project is implemented) is smaller than a half. Imple-
mentation still requires a higher degree of agreement among signals than rejection,
and so β1 <
1
2
.
Proposition 2 Suppose that members do not manipulate information, and that the
voting rule is unanimity. For λ1 > λ, the committee chooses
X = 1 if s1 = s2 = sg
X = 1 with probability β∗1 if s1 6= s2
X = 0 if s1 = s2 = sb
where β∗1 solves p+λ1bπ (X = 1; β1) = λ1bπ (X = 0;β1) and satisfies β∗1 < 12 . Member
1’s strategy is to vote v1 = vg if s1 = s2 = sg; v1 = vg with probability β
∗
1 in case
of s1 6= s2; and v1 = vb if s1 = s2 = sb. Member 2’s strategy is v2 = vg unless
s1 = s2 = s
b.
We would like to stress three features of this equilibrium. First, it implies that the
member who cares the least about his reputation, member 1, is decisive. The role of
member 2 is limited to providing information. Second, the frequency with which the
7Another strategy for agent 2 would be to vote favourably irrespective of the signals.
8For the derivation, see the proof of Proposition 2.
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implementation decision is distorted is increasing in the weight member 1 attaches
to his reputation; member 2’s reputational concern is immaterial. Finally, the less
biased the members are towards the project, i.e., the closer p is to zero, the more
frequent the committee distorts the implementation decision as the costs of voting
favourably in case of conflicting signals go down.
5 Information may be manipulated
In the previous section, we have seen that member 2 may be frustrated in his attempt
to implement the project. Member 1 is less inclined to vote favourably, and as a
consequence member 2’s role is reduced to providing information. In this section,
we analyse how member 2 can exploit his role of information provider to further his
own interests. We therefore now assume that information can be manipulated. This
means that at least a shadow of doubt may remain about the veracity of a member’s
statement even after the deliberations have taken place in the communication stage.
Thus, behaviour of member i in the communication stage is characterized by a
communication strategy mi (si) = Pr (mi = mg|si) for si ∈
©
sb, sg
ª
. Three types of
communication strategies play an important role. Information sharing means that
private information is revealed, mi (sg) = 1 and mi
¡
sb
¢
= 0. Exaggeration refers
to a strategy in which too rosy a picture is painted, mi (sg) = 1 and mi
¡
sb
¢
> 0.
Underreporting, finally, refers to a strategy in which positive information is manip-
ulated, mi (sg) < 1 and mi
¡
sb
¢
= 0. The latter strategy can be ignored in this
section given the interests of the members and because of unanimity.
In the previous section we have shown that if both members care little about
their reputation, λi ≤ λ, neither member has an incentive to deviate from the first-
best decision rule as neither is willing to accept a bad project in return for a better
reputation. For λ2 > λ > λ1, and for given posterior probabilities (2), member 2
would like to implement the project in case of s1 6= s2, whereas member 1 votes
against. Anticipating member 1’s behaviour, and knowing that member 1 will vote
favourably when both messages are positive, member 2 may exaggerate the benefits
of the project (report m2 = mg while s2 = sb) in an attempt to make member 1 cast
a vote for implementation. Given member 1’s voting behaviour, always exaggerating
the benefits of the project cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy of member 2:
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as member 2’s message would be devoid of content, the decision to implement or
to reject would depend solely on the view held by member 1. No comparison of
signals received by members 1 and 2 would be possible. As a result, either decision
would lead to the same reputation, bπ (X = 1) = bπ (X = 0) = π. Member 2 will
therefore exaggerate with a probability γ2 := m2
¡
sb
¢
< 1. Clearly, member 1
takes into account member 2’s inclination to exaggerate. He will therefore only vote
favourably in case (s1,m2) = (sg,mg) if
p + E (µ | s1 = sg,m2 = mg) + λ1bπ (X = 1; γ2) > λ1bπ (X = 0; γ2) (5)
With γ2 = 0, (5) was assumed to hold, see assumption 1. The more frequent
member 2 exaggerates, the less information the message m2 = mg contains, and the
lower is E (µ | s1 = sg,m2 = mg). Possibly, γ2 is that high that member 1 prefers
maintaining the status quo to implementing the project.
If member 2 exaggerates with probability γ2, this means that, conditional on s2 =
sb, he is indifferent between telling the truth and exaggeration when the message
he sends is pivotal. His message is pivotal only if s1 = sg, and so γ2 satisfies
p+ E
¡
µ | s1 = sg, s2 = sb
¢
+ λ2bπ (X = 1; γ2) = λ2bπ (X = 0; γ2) or
p+ λ2bπ (X = 1; γ2) = λ2bπ (X = 0; γ2) (6)
The more member 2 cares about his reputation, and the smaller the expected loss
incurred in case of implementation on the basis of conflicting information, the more
likely it becomes that he paints too rosy a picture. In particular, if λ2 → ∞, then
in equilibrium γ2 → 1, provided (5) holds. This condition holds if member 1 is
willing to follow his signal if he were to decide in isolation, (i.e., X = 1 if and only
if s1 = sg, which requires p+ πu > 0).
If member 1 also cares considerably about his reputation, λ2 > λ1 > λ, he
is more willing to accept exaggeration by member 2: a larger value of λ1 makes
condition (5) hold for a larger parameter set. However, what does not change is
the information on the basis of which he votes for implementation: v1 = vg if and
only if (s1,m2) = (sg,mg). To understand why, consider the remaining possibilities
(s1,m2), which, in increasing order of implied expected project loss, are
¡
sg,mb
¢
,¡
sb,mg
¢
, or
¡
sb,mb
¢
. Now take (s1,m2) =
¡
sg,mb
¢
, which must mean that s2 = sb.
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For s2 = sb, member 2 is indifferent between X = 1 and X = 0. As member 1
cares less about his reputation than member 2, he must have a strict preference
for X = 0 if (s1,m2) =
¡
sg,mb
¢
, so v1 = vb. Hence, also v1 = vb in case of
(s1,m2) =
©¡
sb,mg
¢
,
¡
sb,mb
¢ª
.
Proposition 3 Suppose information can be manipulated, and suppose λ2 > λ. Let
γ2 = γ
∗
2 solve Equation (6). If (a) p + πu > 0, an equilibrium exists in which
(i) the committee chooses X = 1 if and only if m1 = m2 = mg; (ii) member 1
shares his information, and votes v1 = vg if and only if m1 = m2 = mg; (iii)
member 2 exaggerates with probability γ∗2 if s2 = s
b, and votes v2 = vg if and only
if m1 = m2 = mg; If instead (b) p + πu ≤ 0, then the equilibrium is as described
under (a) if (5) is satisfied for γ2 = γ
∗
2; otherwise member 1 always votes against
implementation.
A comparison between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 shows that there are two
implications of relaxing the assumption that information cannot be manipulated.
First, when information may be manipulated, member 2 rather than member 1
determines the extent to which the implementation decision is distorted. Second,
the inclination to manipulate may be so strong that the information provided in
the communication stage becomes too unreliable as a foundation for the decision to
implement the project.
6 The optimal voting rule
So far we have assumed the committee uses a voting rule which stipulates that im-
plementation requires two favourable votes. We now show that this rule is desirable
from a public point of view, both when information cannot and when it can be
manipulated.
Suppose that information cannot be manipulated. Unanimity rule makes the
member who cares the least about his reputation decisive. A deviation from the first-
best decision rule only occurs if he cares considerably about his reputation, λ1 > λ.
Had the formal decision rule required merely one positive vote for implementation,
the member who cares most about his reputation would have become decisive. A
deviation from the first—best decision rule would have occured as soon as λ2 > λ.
16
Moreover, as λ2 > λ1, the deviation from the first—best decision rule would have
been larger. By imposing unanimity, the vote of the member whose preferences
resemble those of the public most, the public’s ally, is decisive in case of a conflict
among the members of the committee. Clearly, this result also holds in case of more
than 2 members.
In case information can be manipulated, it can be shown that the voting rule is
immaterial. As this finding is specific to the two—member committee and does not
generally extend to n—member committees we have relegated its derivation to the
appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose a committee of two members. If information cannot be
manipulated, unanimity is the voting rule that best aligns the interests of committee
members and society. If information can be manipulated, unanimity and majority
perform equally well.
That unanimity performs so well from the public’s perspective is thanks to the
fact that differences among committee members are limited to one dimension —
the degree to which they care about their reputations. Had they disagreed also
on the a priori value of the project, p, unanimity would probably have stymied
decision making as the most conservative member, the one with the lowest a priori
expectation, would play a very important role. Indeed, if members were to care to the
same extent about their reputations, the most conservative member would become
decisive. Only if the public were equally conservative this would be beneficial.
If members were to care to the same degree about their reputations, the formal
decision rule would be immaterial. All information would be truthfully revealed,
even if it could be manipulated, and members would agree as to the best decision on
the project. Delegating the decision to one member or requiring unanimity would
not affect the final decision taken. Of course, if neither member were to care about
his reputation, this decision would coincide with the socially desirable one. The
following proposition, which is a variant of a result in Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi
and Yariv (2003), summarises.
Proposition 5 Suppose committee members care to the same degree about their
reputation. Then, the voting rule does not influence the decision taken by the com-
mittee.
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6.1 The desire to speak with one voice
We have assumed that the market can base the members’ ex post reputations only
on the implementation decision, X. In particular, it does not observe the true state
µ, nor has it got access to the voting record or to a transcript of the meeting.
The committee members may not be able to make µ observable. However, they
may decide to publish the voting record or a transcript of the meeting or they
could organize a press conference after the meeting. We now show that committee
members who care about their reputations will show a united front and speak with
one voice both concerning the votes they cast and the views they presented in the
meeting.
Suppose the committee members would truthfully report the views (m1,m2)
they exchanged during the meeting. These views, and not the decision taken on
the project, would then determine the market’s impression of a member’s decision-
making competence. Suppose that information was shared in the meeting. It is
easy to verify that bπ (s1 = s2) > π > bπ (s1 6= s2) in case of truthful reporting: as
smart members receive identical signals, opposing signals are a clear indication that
at least one member is dumb. This means that once a decision has been taken by
the committee both members have an interest in deviating from truthful revelation
and in showing a united front. In case of implementation they will claim that both
of them possessed favourable information, while if the project is rejected they will
underline that both of them regarded the project as undesirable. Thus, statements
about the views exchanged cannot form a useful basis for forming a belief about the
competence of a committee member. As a result, the market updates its beliefs on
the basis of the decision taken. Note that a united front supporting implementation
commands a higher reputation than a united front supporting the status quo, as
the market knows that in any equilibrium implementation signals a larger degree of
signal concurrence than maintaining the status quo (because p < 0).
The same line of reasoning applies if information could be manipulated during
the meeting. If the project is implemented as a result of member 2 exaggerating,
he is not going to say he really had negative information (i.e., information different
from member 1). Nor will he claim m2 = mg if the project failed to be accepted as
this would once again hurt his reputation.
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Along similar lines one can show that committee members have an incentive
to conceal differences in votes cast. When votes differ, the public infers that the
committee members have received conflicting signals, not that they care to different
degrees about their reputation. Differences in weights attached to reputation would
not lead to differences in votes cast as long as all signals would be the same. Dif-
ferences in votes cast would damage members’ reputations. Consequently, once the
committee members know which decision will be taken, they will conceal differences
in votes cast.
Proposition 6 Committee members who care about their reputation show a united
front.
7 Committees of n members
We now analyse committees of more than two members, i ∈ I = {1, ..., n}, n > 2. It
will be useful to introduce some notation and terminology. Let k denote the number
of positive signals received by the n members, and let E [µ|k] denote the expected
value of µ conditional on k positive signals. The first—best decision rule equals
X = 1 if and only if k ≥ kFB, where the number kFB is such that p + E [µ|k] ≶ 0
for k ≶ kFB. The total number of positive messages sent is denoted by ω. A voting
rule, finally, is characterized by a positive integer f such that X = 1 if and only if
|vg| ≥ f , where |vg| denotes the number of votes vg cast by the members.
As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the case that committee members care
to the same degree about their reputations (λi = λ for all i ∈ I). As member i’s
preferences coincide with those of any other member, information is shared in the
communication stage. As a result, the identity of the member reporting, say, mg, is
irrelevant, and voting strategies will depend on the total number of positive messages
ω only, vi (ω) = Pr (vi = vg|ω). Furthermore, members’ voting strategies coincide.
Consequently, the voting rule is immaterial. If, moreover, members’ preferences
equal those of the public, i.e., λ = 0, then the voting strategy of any member is such
that the first-best decision rule is the equilibrium outcome as vi (ω) = 1 if and only
ω ≥ kFB.
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Proposition 7 Suppose a committee consists of n members who care to the same
degree λ about their reputations. Then there exists an equilibrium in which in-
formation is shared and individual voting strategies coincide. The voting rule is
immaterial. If, moreover, λ = 0, then the voting strategy of any member is such
that the first-best decision rule is the equilibrium outcome.
The determination of the first-best decision rule is a statistical matter. Sah and
Stiglitz (1988) show that for a committee of given size, the minimal number kFB of
positive signals goes down in p, the a priori quality of the project.9 With an absolute
value of p that is sufficiently small, and n odd, a simple majority of positive signals,
kFB = 1
2
(n+ 1), is the first-best decision rule.10 More negative values of p require
qualified majorities.
There is an interesting implication if kFB = 1
2
(n+ 1) is the first-best decision
rule: even if committee members are concerned with their reputation, λi > 0, this
concern does not influence voting behaviour as there is no difference in reputation
between implementation and status quo, bπ (X = 1) = bπ (X = 0). To see this, as-
sume there are, say, five members, and kFB = 3, such that k ∈ {0, 1, 2} leads to
status quo and k ∈ {3, 4, 5} leads to implementation. If k = 0 or 5, all signals
concur (all sb or all sg, respectively); if k = 1 or 4, four signals are the same, while if
k = 2 or 3 only three are the same. That is, the average degree of agreement among
signals is the same whether a project is implemented or rejected. The decision on
the project, then, does not reveal any information about the quality of the members
of the committee.
Proposition 8 Suppose a committee consists of n members, n odd, who may care
about their reputations, λi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I. If the first-best decision rule is a
simple majority of positive signals, kFB = 1
2
(n+ 1), then, in equilibrium, the ex post
reputations of implementation and status quo are equal, bπ (X = 1) = bπ (X = 0) =
π. Reputational concerns do not influence the individual voting strategies. Nor
will information be manipulated. That is, information is shared, individual voting
strategies coincide and are such that the first-best decision rule is the equilibrium
outcome.
9To be precise, kFB is a non-increasing function of p as kFB is integer-valued.
10Sah and Stiglitz also show that the larger is the committee, the smaller the absolute value of
p must be for simple majority rule to be optimal.
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In what follows we limit attention to kFB > 1
2
(n+ 1), implying that p < 0.
Moreover, as the decision to implement now implies a higher degree of similar-
ity among signals than the decision to maintain the status quo, we have thatbπ (X = 1) > bπ (X = 0). We assume that members are concerned with their rep-
utations, 0 < λ1 < ... < λj < ... < λn.11
7.1 Information cannot be manipulated
Because the interests of the members differ from those of the public, individual voting
strategies may not yield the first-best decision rule as the equilibrium outcome.
As observed in section 6, by imposing unanimity, the vote of the member whose
preferences resemble those of the public most, the public’s ally, is decisive in case of
a conflict among the members of the committee. Imposing unanimity ensures that
the decision to implement the project or not is delegated to member 1, while the
information used in the decision is obtained from n members. This is clearly best
from the public’s perspective.
Proposition 9 If committee members agree on the a priori value of the project
p < 0, but care to different degrees about their reputation, and if information cannot
be manipulated, the voting rule that promotes the public’s interests best is unanimity
rule, f = n.
In this subsection we therefore assume that the voting rule is unanimity rule.
As information cannot be manipulated, a voting strategy will be written as vi (ω) =
Pr (vi = v
g|ω). Let ω1 denote a threshold value of member 1 such that v1 (ω) = 1 if
and only if ω ≥ ω1. If member 1 cares little about his reputation, his equilibrium
voting strategy is such that the first-best decision rule is the equilibrium outcome,
i.e., v1 (ω) = 1 if and only if ω ≥ ω∗1, with ω∗1 = kFB. If he cares considerably about
his reputation, a project will sometimes be implemented even though its expected
value is negative, ω∗1 < k
FB. There is, however, a limit to the degree to which
member 1 distorts the implementation decision. As in equilibrium bπ (X = 1) >bπ (X = 0) must hold, implementation should, on average, be based on a smaller
11We exclude the possibility λi = λi0 as it is notationally burdensome but does not provide any
additional insight.
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number of conflicting signals than maintaining the status quo. This implies that
implementation should be based on at least a majority of positive signals.
Proposition 10 describes the equilibrium. Part (i) is the n-member equivalent of
Proposition 1, whereas part (ii) shows how Proposition 2 generalises. The equilib-
rium posterior beliefs bπ (X = x) for x ∈ {0, 1} are obtained using Bayes’ rule and
the equilibrium strategies
Proposition 10 Suppose information cannot be manipulated in a committee of n
members. Suppose the voting rule is unanimity rule.
(i) If member 1 cares little about his reputation,
λ1 ≤ λ :=
−
¡
p+ E
£
µ|kFB − 1¤¢bπ (X = 1)− bπ (X = 0) , (7)
then there is an equilibrium in which member 1’s voting strategy equals v1 (ω) = 1 if
and only if ω ≥ ω∗1 = kFB. A weakly dominant voting strategy for the other members
is vi (ω) = 1 if and only if ω ≥ kFB. The first-best decision rule is the equilibrium
outcome.
(ii) If λ1 > λ, then one of the following holds.
(ii—a) There is an equilibrium in which member 1’s voting strategy equals v1 (ω) = 1
if and only if ω ≥ ω∗1, with ω∗1 < kFB and
p+ E [µ|ω∗1] + λ1bπ (X = 1) > λ1bπ (X = 0) (8)
p+ E [µ|ω∗1 − 1] + λ1bπ (X = 1) < λ1bπ (X = 0) (9)
Moreover, a weakly dominant voting strategy for the other members is vi (ω) = 1 if
and only if ω ≥ ω∗1.12
(ii—b) There is an equilibrium in which member 1’s voting strategy equals v1 (ω) = 1
if ω ≥ ω∗1; v1 (ω∗1 − 1) = β∗1 ∈ (0, 1); and v1 (ω) = 0 if ω < ω∗1 − 1, where (ω∗1, β∗1)
satisfies13
p+ E [µ|ω∗1 − 1] + λ1bπ (X = 1) = λ1bπ (X = 0) (10)
12Furthermore, in equilibrium we have ω∗i ∈
©
ω, ..., kFB − 1
ª
, where, if n is even, ω = 12n+ 1,
whereas in case of n odd, ω = 12 (n+ 3). This implies that in equilibrium implementation still
yields a higher reputation than maintaining the status quo.
13Of course, bπ (X = x) depend on (ω∗1, β∗1).
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A weakly dominant voting strategy for the other members is vi (ω) = 1 if and only
if ω ≥ ω∗1.14
Eq (9) says that for given posterior beliefs bπ (X = 1) and bπ (X = 0) consistent
with ω∗1, member 1 would not like to see the project implemented in case of one
positive message less, ω∗1 − 1. He therefore does not mix in case of ω = ω∗1 − 1. In
case (ii—b), the situation is different. Now for given beliefs bπ (X = 1) and bπ (X = 0)
consistent with ω∗1, member 1 would like to implement if ω = ω
∗
1 − 1. But if the
posterior beliefs were based on him implementing with probability one for ω∗1 − 1,
then he would like to refrain from implementing if ω = ω∗1 − 1. As a result, there is
a value β∗1 ∈ (0, 1) such that v1 (ω∗1 − 1) = β∗1, where (ω∗1, β∗1) is characterized by Eq
(10).
7.2 Information can be manipulated
As members differ in the weights they attach to their reputations, a member i > 1
may want to see the project implemented although member 1 chooses the status
quo. Consider Proposition 10, part (i) and (iia). If member 1 votes favourably only
if ω ≥ ω∗1, then, for given posterior beliefs, member n would have liked to see the
project implemented in case of ω∗1−1 (or even fewer) positive signals if the following
condition holds:
λn > λ :=
− (p+ E [µ|ω∗1 − 1])bπ (X = 1)− bπ (X = 0) (11)
Member n has an incentive to exaggerate in the communication stage, and possibly
other members have. Analogously, one can derive the condition such that member
n wants to exaggerate in case member 1 follows a mixed voting strategy when
information cannot be manipulated (cf Proposition 10, part (iib)). This condition
can be found in the Appendix (Condition A.1). In this subsection we assume that
at least member n wants to manipulate information.
Assumption 2 The value of λn is such that member n wants to manipulate infor-
mation.
14Furthermore, in equilibrium ω∗1 ∈
©
ω, ..., kFB
ª
holds, where, if n is even, ω = 12n + 1 and
β∗1 <
1
2 , whereas in case of n odd, ω =
1
2 (n+ 3) and β
∗
1 < 1.
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We now determine what an equilibrium looks like in this situation. We first
continue assuming that the voting rule is unanimity rule and then turn to other
majority rules. We close this section with a number of examples that show how the
choice of voting rule influences the quality of information exchange in the communi-
cation stage and the alignment of the decisive member’s interests with those of the
public.
Unanimity Rule
As far as the transmission of private information is concerned, all members fall
into one of the three following sets, IS, IE, and I+. The set IS consists of members
i > 1 who attach a weight to their reputation λi that is sufficiently close to λ1 such
that i is not frustrated by 1’s behaviour in the voting stage. A member i ∈ IS
has therefore no reason to manipulate information, and shares information in the
communication stage. As 1 ∈ IS, this set is non-empty. Let i = σ denote the
member with the highest weight λi who is part of IS, IS = {1, . . . , σ}. Because of
Assumption 2, we know that σ < n (or IS ⊂ I).
The set IE consists either of one member h or is empty. If it is non—empty
in equilibrium, it consists of a member who is frustrated by 1’s voting behaviour
as λh differs too much from λ1. He therefore exaggerates with some probability
γh := mh
¡
sb
¢
∈ (0, 1). This implies that, for given voting strategies, h is indifferent
between reporting mg and mb conditional on sh = sb and on his message being
pivotal. Recall that this means that by sending mg the project is implemented,
whereas by sending mb the status quo is maintained. Hence, for sh = sb, the
increase in h’s reputation is exactly offset by the loss made on the project.
Any member who cares more about his reputation than h, when contemplating
whether to manipulate information or not, has a strict preference for exaggeration:
mi
¡
sb
¢
= 1. Any such member is part of I+. As a consequence, information
provided by members i ∈ I+ is useless and therefore ignored in the decision whether
to implement the project or not. The set I+ may be empty. Because of Condition
2, we know that at least member n exaggerates, and so IE and I+ cannot both be
empty.
It could be that the set of members I+ exaggerating information is so large
that member 1 would not be willing to implement the project even if all members
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i ∈ IS send positive messages. Consider the extreme situation IS = {1}, h = 2,
and I+ = {3, ..., n}, with member h caring so much about his reputation that
γ∗h → 1. Essentially, we are back in the situation described in section 5. There
we derived that a sufficient condition for an equilibrium to exist in which a project
is sometimes implemented is that member 1 is willing to follow his signal when he
decides in isolation. That is, p + πu > 0 should hold. Clearly, if some members
2, ..., n care less about their reputation, such that γ∗h < 1 or h > 2, there will always
be sufficiently many and/or sufficiently informative messages inducing member 1 to
implement the project as long as p+ πu > 0 holds. If instead p+ πu ≤ 0, such may
not be the case, and vi = vb for i ∈ IS and in particular for i = 1, irrespective of
the messages sent.
Lemma 1 Suppose information can be manipulated in a committee of n members
and suppose Assumption 2 holds. Suppose the voting rule is unanimity rule. A
sufficient condition for an equilibrium to exist in which a project is sometimes im-
plemented is that member 1 follows his signal when he decides in isolation, i.e.,
p + πu > 0 hold. If instead p + πu ≤ 0 an equilibrium in which a project is imple-
mented may not exist.
In determining the value of the project, the number ω of positive messages per
se is no longer relevant as n − 1− σ messages are useless and the message sent by
h is manipulated. Let ω
¡
IS
¢
denote the number of positive messages mi = mg sent
by committee members in set IS. Let ω1
¡
IS
¢
be the minimum number of positive
messages sent by members of IS that member 1 requires to vote v1 = vg with prob-
ability one. Voting strategies amount to vi
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,mh
¢
= Pr
¡
vi = v
g|ω ¡IS¢ ,mh¢,
indicating that the voting strategy will depend on the number of positive messages
sent by members of IS and on the message sent by member h.
To spare the reader the mathematical details, the following proposition sum-
marises the characterization of an equilibrium in case of unanimity. The companion
proposition A.1 in the Appendix provides the details.
Proposition 11 Suppose information can be manipulated in a committee of n mem-
bers. Suppose the voting rule is unanimity rule, f = n, suppose Assumption 2 holds
and assume p + πu > 0. An equilibrium is characterized by a group of members
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IS = {1, . . . , σ∗} who share information; and members i > σ∗ who exaggerate. The
latter group may consist of a member h who exaggerates with probability γ∗h < 1,
or of members who exaggerate with probability one, or of both. As member 1’s vote
is decisive, the difference in degree to which he cares about his repuation and other
members do determines the number and identity of members sharing information.
To show that there does not need to be a member who exaggerates with a
probability γ∗h < 1, consider a three—member committee in which members 1 and
2 care to approximately the same small degree about their reputation, whereas
member 3 cares considerably about his reputation, 0 . λ1 . λ2 ¿ λ3. Member 3
always sends message m3 = mg, and is therefore ignored. The committee becomes
essentially a two—member committee, and the analysis of section 5 applies: as long
as λ2 is not too large, member 2 shares his private information.
Other Majority Rules
So far, we have assumed unanimity rule. This is, however, not necessarily the
voting rule most desirable from the public’s perspective. We first characterize equi-
librium committee behaviour in case of other majority rules, and then provide a
number of examples showing what makes one rule rather than another preferable.
Assume a majority rule, f < n, and let d = n + 1 − f be the member whose
vote is decisive: if he votes favourably, then so do members i > d, implying that the
project is implemented. If he votes against, then so do members i < d, implying that
the required majority is not attained and the status quo is maintained. Members
with interests sufficiently similar to those of member d share their information. This
set is IS = {σ, . . . , d, . . . , σ}. It is non-empty as d ∈ IS. As in case of unanimity,
there may be committee members who exaggerate with probability one, i ∈ I+, or
with some probability γh less than one, i = h. However, there may now also be
members i < d who would have conditioned implementation on a larger minimal
number of positive messages than member d requires. There may therefore be a
set of members, I−, such that any member i ∈ I− underreports with probability
one (mi = mb if si = sg). In equilibrium, these messages are ignored. Analogous
to the existence of a member h, there may now be a member l characterized by
a probability of underreporting γl = Pr
¡
ml = m
b|sl = sg
¢
∈ (0, 1). Analogous to
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the voting strategies in case of unanimity, voting strategies can now be written as
vi
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
. As under unanimity, as long as member d is willing to follow
his signal when he decides in isolation, an equilibrium exists in which a project is
sometimes implemented. This requires p+πu > 0. If p+πu ≤ 0, such an equilibrium
may exist. Otherwise, vd = 0 and X = 0 in equilibrium.
The following proposition summarises the characterization of an equilibrium in
case of majority. The companion proposition A.2 in the Appendix provides the
details.
Proposition 12 Consider a committee of n members using a majority rule f , im-
plying that member d = n + 1 − f is decisive. Assume information can be manip-
ulated. Suppose Assumption 2 holds and assume p + πu > 0. An equilibrium is
characterized by a group of members IS = {σ∗, . . . , d, . . . , σ∗} who share informa-
tion; members i > σ∗ who exaggerate; and members i < σ∗ who underreport. The
first group may consist of a member h who exaggerates with probability γ∗h < 1,
or of members who exaggerate with probability one, or of both. The latter group
may consist of a member h who exaggerates with probability γ∗h < 1, or of members
who exaggerate with probability one, or of both. As member d’s vote is decisive, the
difference in degree to which he cares about his repuation and other members do
determines the number and identity of members sharing information.
Comparing Unanimity and Other Majority Rules
That unanimity is not necessarily the socially desirable voting rule if information
can be manipulated can be illustrated by means of the following example. Consider a
five—member committee in which member 1 and 2 care little about their reputations,
but the other three members considerably and to roughly the same degree, 0 .
λ1 . λ2 ¿ λ3 . λ4 . λ5. In case of unanimity as the voting rule, member
3, 4 and 5 all exaggerate with probability one. The implementation decision is
then based on information held by member 1 and 2. If, instead, the voting rule
is a majority of three, member 1 and 2 would manipulate their information (they
would underreport with probability one), and members 3, 4, and 5 would share their
private information. The implementation decision would now depend on three pieces
of truthfully revealed information. Therefore, if the voting rule makes member 3
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(or 4 or 5) decisive the decision on the project is based on more information than
if the voting rule makes member 1 (or 2) decisive. However, because member 3
cares much about his reputation, he has too strong an incentive to implement the
project. Hence, in the present example the public faces a trade-off when choosing the
optimal voting rule. By making member 1 decisive the public ensures that given the
available information the optimal decision is made. By making member 3 decisive,
the decision might be distorted but it is based on more information.
This example also suggests that replacing a member with someone who cares
less about his reputation may lead to a worse outcome from the public’s perspective.
Consider, e.g., a committee of five members, consisting of a fairly homogenous group
of size four and one member whose preferences are more closely aligned with those
of the public, 0 . λ1 ¿ λ2 . λ3 . λ4 . λ5, such that a majority rule with f = 4 is
best. If one member of the homogenous group is replaced by someone with λ & 0, a
majority rule with f = 3 is best. The only consequence of this replacement is then
to eliminate valuable information from the decision—making process.
Note that in a situation where 0 . λ1 . λ2 . λ3 ¿ λ4 . λ5 unanimity is the
optimal voting rule. The decision will be based on more pieces of information (three
rather than two) and will not be distorted.
7.3 What have we learnt from our model of a committee
with n members?
We have derived three kinds of results. The first result is that our main findings
of the model of a committee with 2 members also hold for a committee with n
members. Thus, the tendency of committee members to speak with one voice is
independent of the size of the committee. Moreover, as in a committee with 2
members, in a committee with n members, reputational concerns may lead some
members to exaggerate the benefits of projects. As to the latter finding, it is worth
noting that in a committee with n members, some members may always exaggerate
benefits, while in a committee with 2 members benefits are sometimes exaggerated.
Second, our analysis offers a new insight into the question on the optimal voting
rule. The voting rule determines the identity of the member who is decisive in the
voting stage and the quality of information exchange in the communication stage.
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The analysis of the model of a committee with 2 members shows that it makes
sense to make the member who cares the least about his reputation decisive. This
member has the weakest incentive to distort the implementation decision as his
preferences are closest to the public’s preferences. The equilibria of the model of a
committee with n members show that with a view on utilizing members’ privately
held information, it may be that another member should be made decisive. The
reason is that as to manipulation of information what matters is how much members’
preferences deviate from the preferences of the decisive member. In a committee in
which member 1 is an outlier and a homogeneous group of members with similar
preferences exists, it is possibly optimal to make a member of the group decisive.
This may lead to better informed decisions. Of course, if information cannot be
manipulated, unanimity remains the best voting rule.
Our third result is related to the second one. It is possible that it is not in the
interest of the public to replace a member of the committee with a member whose
preferences are more congruent with the preferences of the public. The reason is
that an ally of the public may have too strong incentives to manipulate information.
As a result his information will be ignored.
8 Concluding remarks
It seems quite likely that experts on committees care much about how people per-
ceive their abilities. We have shown that much of the behaviour of committee
members can be explained by reputational concerns. Examples of such behaviour
are the tendency of committees to close ranks in public, and the inclination of some
committee members to exaggerate the benefits of a proposal or to suppress their
personal doubts.
We are aware that our results hinge on several specific assumptions. We end
this paper by elaborating on three of them. First, we have focused on the situation
in which a committee member is concerned with his perceived ability. As a result,
committees want to speak with one voice. Other types of reputation may be at
stake, making speaking with one voice less desirable. A committee member may
want to show that he is an independent thinker, holding views about the correct
decision different from those of the winning majority. An example could be an
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academic advisor on an advisory committee. Alternatively, if a committee member
represents a group, like an organizational division, he may want to reveal that he
voted in line with the agreed upon group mandate, even if he did not have his way
in the committee meeting. Such considerations may explain part of the observed
dissenting votes at the FOMC.15
Second, we have assumed that the ex ante expected value of the project is nega-
tive. As a result, implementing the project is good for one’s reputation. Clearly, with
a positive ex ante expected value, maintaining the status quo would have strength-
ened a member’s reputation. In either case, if information cannot be manipulated,
it is best from a social point of view to delegate the implementation decision to
the member who is least concerned with his reputation. If instead information can
be manipulated a balance has to be struck between information exchange in the
meeting on the one hand, and putting the actual decision power in the hands of the
member most inclined to decide in line with the public’s interests.
Finally, we have assumed that the public observes the decision on the project,
but does not observe outcomes. At the expense of more algebra, but without af-
fecting our results qualitatively, we could have assumed that the public observes
outcomes, but that there are unpredictable factors affecting outcomes that neither
smart committee members nor dumb committee members observe. The larger is
the unpredictable part of outcomes, the stronger are the reputational effects on the
behaviour of the committee members.
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Appendix
The appendix presents the proofs of propositions 1, 2, and 4. Next we present
Condition A.1 that rules when member n wants to manipulate information if member
1 follows a mixed equilibrium voting strategy. Finally we present the ‘companion’
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propositions describing equilibrium behaviour if information can be manipulated in
an n−member committee, 11 and A.2.
Proof of Proposition 1: We first show that the posterior beliefs are consistent
with the imputed equilibrium strategies. bπ (X = 1) = Pr (ti = sm|X = 1) To use
Bayes’ rule we need expressions like
Pr (X = 1|ti = sm) = Pr (µ = u) Pr (X = 1|ti = sm, µ = u)
+Pr (µ = −u) Pr (X = 1|ti = sm, µ = −u)
where, because of the imputed strategy, X = 1 iff s1 = s2 = sg. So,
Pr (X = 1|ti = sm, µ = u) = Pr (s1 = s2 = sg|ti = sm, µ = u) = π+(1− π) 1
2
=
1
2
(1 + π)
Similarly, Pr (X = 1|ti = sm, µ = −u) = 0 (as X = 1 requires at least si = sg,
but µ = −u and ti = sm implies that si = sb). Therefore, Pr (X = 1|ti = sm) =
1
4
(1 + π). Similar calculations show that Pr (X = 1|ti = du) = 14 . From this it
follows that Pr (X = 0|ti = sm) = 14 (3− π) and Pr (X = 0|ti = du) = 34 . Using
Bayes’ rule, bπ (X = 1) = 1+π
1+π2π and bπ (X = 0) = 3−π3−π2π follow immediately.
We now show that for given posterior beliefs the strategies are equilibrium
strategies if and only if λ1 ≤ λ. In case of s1 = s2 = sg, X = 1 is preferred
to X = 0 by both members, because implementation is best from a project per-
spective and from a reputational point of view (see assumption 1 and observe thatbπ (X = 1) > bπ (X = 0)). In case of s1 6= s2, E[µ|s1 6= s2] = 0, and member i
favours maintaining the status quo if p + 0 + λibπ (X = 1) ≤ λibπ (X = 0) or if
λi ≤ λ := −peπ(X=1)−eπ(X=0) . As implementation requires unanimity, the status quo
is maintained if λ1 ≤ λ. Clearly, if member 1 refrains from voting favourably in case
of two conflicting signals, so he does in case of s1 = s2 = sb. If instead λ1 > λ, both
members 1 and 2 want to implement the project in case of conflicting signals, and
the posterior beliefs bπ (X = 1) and bπ (X = 0) cannot be equilibrium beliefs. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows from the analysis provided in the text.
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Here we limit ourselves to deriving the posterior beliefs stated in Eq (3). Note that
Pr (X = 1|t1 = sm, µ = u) = 1 + π
2
+
1− π
2
β1
Pr (X = 1|t1 = sm, µ = −u) = 1− π
2
β1
Pr (X = 1|t1 = du, µ = u) = 1 + π
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
β1
¶
+
1− π
2
1
2
β1
Pr (X = 1|t1 = du, µ = −u) = 1− π
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
β1
¶
+
1 + π
2
1
2
β1
and so
Pr (X = 1|t1 = sm) = 1
4
(1 + π + 2 (1− π) β1)
Pr (X = 1|t1 = du) = 1
4
(1 + 2β1)
from which bπ (X = 1; β1) = (1+π)+2(1−π)β1(1+π2)+(1−π2)β1π immediately follows using Bayes’ rule.
The fact that we conditioned the probabilities on the type of member 1 is immaterial
as can be readily checked. Using Pr (X = 0|t1) = 1 − Pr (X = 1|t1) one finds thatbπ (X = 0; β1) = 3−π−2(1−π)β13−π2−2(1−π2)β1π. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: In the text we showed that in case information cannot
be manipulated, unanimity rule is best. Here we show that if information can
be manipulated, and the committee consists of two members, the voting rule is
immaterial.
In section 5 we have shown that if λ2 < λ, neither member wants to deviate from
the first—best decision rule, and so unanimity and simple majority perform equally
well.
Now assume λ2 > λ. In case of unanimity, Eq (6) specifies the probability γ∗2
with which member 2 states m2 = mg if s2 = sb. A project is implemented only
if both members are positive during the meeting, m1 = m2 = mg. As a result, a
project is implemented with probability one if (s1, s2) = (sg, sg), with probability
γ∗2 < 1 if (s1, s2) =
¡
sg, sb
¢
, and with probability zero if (s1, s2) =
©¡
sb, sg
¢
,
¡
sb, sb
¢ª
.
If instead a single positive vote suffices for project implementation, member 2
does not have to manipulate his information, as he can now force implementation by
voting v2 = vg. Now either member 1 wants to manipulate his private information
or not. Suppose not. Then, member 2 implements the project if (s1, s2) = (sg, sg)
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with probability one, and, if (s1, s2) =
©¡
sb, sg
¢
,
¡
sg, sb
¢ª
with probability β∗2, where
β∗2 =
1
2
γ∗2. That is, the probability with which a project is implemented and the
expected value conditional on implementation is the same under either voting rule.
Now suppose member 1 wants to manipulate information. Because he cares
less about his reputation he wants to understate his information. Define γ1 =
Pr
¡
m1 = m
b|s1 = sg
¢
and let γ1 > 0. As a result,
E
¡
µ|m1 = mb,m2 = mg
¢
> E
¡
µ|m1 = mg,m2 = mb
¢
(A.1)
Member 2 may vote favourably in case of (m1,m2) = (mg,mg), and with some
probability in case of (m1,m2) =
¡
mb,mg
¢
. This probability is smalller than
one, because if he were to vote v2 = vg with probability one, the overall likeli-
hood of implementation would be equal to the total probability of maintaining the
status quo, and, consequentially, the ex post reputation in case of implementa-
tion would be the same as in case of maintaining the status quo. So, let β2 =
Pr
¡
v2 = v
g|m1 = mb,m2 = mg
¢
< 1, then Pr
¡
v2 = v
g|m1 = mg,m2 = mb
¢
= 0 be-
cause of Eq (A.1). But then member 1’s message is only pivotal in case m2 = mg
(and so s2 = sg). Underreporting yields member 1
Pr (s2 = s
g|s1 = sg) (β2 [p+ E (µ|s1 = sg, s2 = sg) + λ1bπ (X = 1; γ1, β2)] +
(1− β2)λ1bπ (X = 0; γ1, β2))
whereas the payoff in case of truthfully revealing his positive information equals
Pr (s2 = s
g|s1 = sg) [p+ E (µ|s1 = sg, s2 = sg) + λ1bπ (X = 1; γ1, β2)]
Clearly, since in any equilibrium bπ (X = 1; γ1, β2) > bπ (X = 0; γ1, β2) and because
p + E (µ|s1 = sg, s2 = sg) > 0 by Assumption 1, member 1 has a strict preference
for truthfully revealing his positive information. That is, even if he could, member
1 would not manipulate his information. As a result, in a two—member committee
in which information can be manipulated the voting rule is immaterial. QED.
Statement of condition A.1.We here provide the condition that guarantees that
if member 1 follows a mixed equilibrium voting strategy if information cannot be
manipulated, member n wants to exaggerate if information can be manipulated.
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Note that if member 1 follows a mixed equilibrium voting strategy, member n’s
message is pivotal in two situations: if ω = ω∗1 − 2 and if ω = ω∗1 − 1. In the first
case, exaggeration increases the probability of implementation from 0 to β∗1. In the
second case, it increases the probability of implementation from β∗1 to 1.
Condition A.1 Suppose member 1 follows the mixed equilibrium voting strategy
specified in Proposition 10 part (ii), if information cannot be manipulated. Then
member n would like to manipulate information if the following inequality holds
Pr
¡
ω = ω∗1 − 2|sb
¢
β∗1 × (A.2)
(p+ E [µ|ω∗1 − 2] + λn [bπ (X = 1)− bπ (X = 0)]) +
Pr
¡
ω = ω∗1 − 1|sb
¢
(1− β∗1)×
(p+ E [µ|ω∗1 − 1] + λn [bπ (X = 1)− bπ (X = 0)]) > 0
Companion to Proposition 11: Here we characterize the equilibrium in case
information can be manipulated and under unanimity rule in more detail. Different
types of equilibria exist, depending on whether member 1 uses a mixed or pure
equilibrium voting strategy and on whether a member exists who exaggerates with
a probability, (i.e., whether set IE is a singleton or empty). As presenting all four
cases does not add economic intuition, we only characterize an equilibrium in case
member 1 uses a mixed equilibrium voting strategy and IE is non-empty. In the
proposition E [µ|x, zh] denotes the expected value of µ conditional on x positive
messages sent by members i ∈ IS and message or signal z of member h.
Proposition A.1 Suppose information can be manipulated in a committee of n
members. Suppose the voting rule is unanimity rule, f = n, suppose Assumption
2 holds and assume p + πu > 0. An equilibrium is described by the quadruple¡
ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
, β∗1, σ
∗, γ∗h
¢
, with σ∗ < n. Member i ∈ IS = {1, . . . , σ∗} shares information;
member h (with h = σ∗ + 1) exaggerates with probability γ∗h ∈ (0, 1); any member
i ∈ I+ = {σ∗ + 2, . . . , n} exaggerates with probability one. Member 1 votes
v1
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,mh
¢
=



1 for ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
β∗1 for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg
¢
0 for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb
¢
0 for ω
¡
IS
¢
≤ ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 2
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with β∗1 ∈ (0, 1). A weakly dominant strategy for i > 1 is vi
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,mh
¢
= 1 if and
only if ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1. The quadruple
¡
ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
, β∗1, σ
∗, γ∗h
¢
satisfies
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg
¤
+ λ1bπ (X = 1) = λ1bπ (X = 0) (A.3)
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1, sb
¤
+ λhbπ (X = 1) = λhbπ (X = 0) (A.4)
with bπ (X = x) = bπ ¡X = x;ω∗1 ¡IS¢ , β∗1, γ∗h¢ for x ∈ {0, 1} obtained using Bayes’
rule.
Because h follows a mixed messaging strategy, positive messages may now contain
different information on µ. Eq (A.3) says that member 1 is indifferent between vg
and vb if ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1 and mh = mg. As a consequence, 1 has a strict
preference for v1 = vg (v1 = vb) if the messages sent in the communication stage
contain more (less) positive information. It implies that v1 = vb with probability one
if (i) ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
−1 andmh = mb; and (ii) ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
−2, irrespective of
mh. It also implies that v1 = vg with probability one if ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
, irrespective
of mh. Member 1’s voting strategy implies that member h’s message is pivotal only
if ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1, as is confirmed by (A.4). Eq (A.4) also implies that any
member i ∈ I+ exaggerates with probability one, whereas any member i ∈ IS shares
information.
Note that it cannot be the case for member 1 to be indifferent between vg and vb
in case of ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗1
¡
IS
¢
− 1 and mh = mb (rather than mh = mg). The message
mh = m
b implies sh = sb, and so the expected project value in Eqs (A.3) and Eqs
(A.4) would be the same. This cannot be reconciled with λ1 < λh.
Companion to Proposition 11: Similarly to the unanimity case, different types
of equilibrium may exist depending on whether member d follows a pure or mixed
equilibrium voting strategy; on the presence or absence of a member h who exag-
gerates with a probability smaller than one; and on the presence or absence of a
member l who underreports with a probability smaller than one. We only charac-
terize an equilibrium in which member d follows a mixed equilibrium voting strategy
and members l and h exist. In the proposition E [µ|x, yl, zh] denotes the expected
value of µ conditional on x positive messages sent by members i ∈ IS, message or
signal y of member l, and message or signal z of member h.
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Proposition A.2 Consider a committee of n members using a majority rule f , im-
plying that member d = n+1−f is decisive. Assume information can be manipulated,
and assume that at least either member 1 or n would like to manipulate informa-
tion. An equilibrium is characterized by a tuple
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
, β∗d, σ
∗, σ∗, γ∗l , γ
∗
h
¢
. Member
i ∈ IS = {σ∗, . . . , d, . . . , σ∗} shares information; member l (where l = σ∗ − 1) un-
derreports with probability γ∗l ∈ (0, 1); member h (where h = σ∗ + 1) exaggerates
with probability γ∗h ∈ (0, 1); any member i ∈ I− = {1, . . . , σ∗ − 2} underreports with
probability one; any member i ∈ I+ = {σ∗ + 2, . . . , n} exaggerates with probability
one. Member d votes
vd
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=



1 for ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
1 for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mg
¢
β∗d for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mg
¢
0 for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mb
¢
0 for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mb
¢
0 for ω
¡
IS
¢
≤ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 2
if E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mb
¤
< E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mg
¤
. If instead
E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mb
¤
> E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mg
¤
then for
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mb
¢
, we have vd
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
=
1. Of course, β∗d ∈ (0, 1). A weakly dominant voting strategy for i > σ∗ is
vi
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
= 1 if ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1; and a weakly dominant voting
strategy for i < σ∗ is vi
¡
ω
¡
IS
¢
,ml,mh
¢
= 1 if ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
. The tuple¡
ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
, β∗d, σ
∗, σ∗, γ∗l , γ
∗
h
¢
satisfies,
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mg
¤
+ λdbπ (X = 1) = λdbπ (X = 0) (A.5)
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb, sb
¤
+ λhbπ (X = 1) = λhbπ (X = 0) (A.6)
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1, sg,mg
¤
+ λlbπ (X = 1) = λlbπ (X = 0) (A.7)
where bπ (X = x) = bπ ¡X = x;ω∗d ¡IS¢ , β∗d, γ∗l , γ∗h¢.
Most of the statement of the proposition follows from the analysis and charac-
terizations in the main text. Here we pay attention to d’s voting strategy.
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We first show why an equilibrium in which d follows a mixed voting strategy
and l and h mixed communication strategies implies that d can only be indifferent
when both l and h send potentially manipulated messages ((ml,mh) =
¡
mb,mg
¢
).
Essentially, this amounts to showing that if d were indifferent for another message
combination, either l or h would want to follow a pure equilibrium strategy. Without
providing the full details, let us note that a message combination different from
(ml,mh) =
¡
mb,mg
¢
would automatically imply that either h or l (or both) would
be revealing their signal(s). We explicitly analyse one case. Assume d would be
indifferent for the message combination (ml,mh) = (mg,mg). Note, and this is
essential, that ml = mg reveals that sl = sg because member l underreports with
some likelihood. Hence, for member d the following equality would hold
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1, sg,mg
¤
+ λdbπ (X = 1) = λdbπ (X = 0) (A.8)
This would imply that if
ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1 and (ml,mh) ∈
©¡
mb,mg
¢
,
¡
mg,mb
¢
,
¡
mb,mb
¢ª
member d would have a strict preference for vd = vb. Now consider member l, and
assume sl = sg and that his message is pivotal. Let
θ = Pr
¡
mh = m
g|ω ¡IS¢ = ω∗d ¡IS¢− 1, sl = sg¢
Then, by sending ml = mg he obtains
θ
¡
β∗d
¡
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1, sg,mg
¤
+ λlbπ (X = 1)¢+ (1− β∗d)λlbπ (X = 0)¢+
(1− θ)λlbπ (X = 0) (A.9)
and by sending ml = mb his payoff equals
λlbπ (X = 0) (A.10)
If l follows a mixed communication strategy he must be indifferent between sending
either message. Equating Eqs (A.9) and (A.10) one sees that the following must
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hold
p+ E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1, sg,mg
¤
+ λlbπ (X = 1) = λlbπ (X = 0) (A.11)
Note that the expected value of µ in Eqs (A.8) and (A.11) is conditioned on the
same information (as ml = mg reveals sl = sg). For both members d and l to follow
a mixed strategy in equilibrium, Eqs (A.8) and (A.11) should both be satisfied. This
is however impossible as λl < λd. By the same token it can be shown that as long as
at least one message sent by either l or h reveals his signal an equilibrium does not
exist in which d, l, and h follow a mixed strategy. It also suggests why members l, d,
and h can follow a mixed strategy in equilibrium if d is indifferent when both l and
h send manipulated messages. This is the only case that the information used in
the determination of the expected value of µ differs from one member to the other.
Next, with d indifferent between vg and vb when ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1 and
(ml,mh) =
¡
mb,mg
¢
, whether d votes vg or vb in case of ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
−
1 and (ml,mh) =
¡
mg,mb
¢
depends on the sign of E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mg,mb
¤
−
E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mg
¤
. If the sign is positive, he votes vg, whereas if it is neg-
ative he votes vb. The sign will depend on the degrees to which members l and h
manipulate the information they present.
Finally, with d indifferent between vg and vb when ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1 and
(ml,mh) =
¡
mb,mg
¢
, he has a strict preference for vg in case of ω
¡
IS
¢
≥ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
, ir-
respective of the messages sent by l and h. Observe that E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
,mb,mh = m
b¤ >
E
£
µ|ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 1,mb,mh = mg
¤
, as h exaggerates with positive probability. The loss
in value due to absence of a manipulated message from h is more than offset by
the gain of one additional positive message sent by some i ∈ IS. If this inequality
holds for ω
¡
IS
¢
= ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
, then it certainly holds for ω
¡
IS
¢
> ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
. Moreover,
if it holds for (ml,mh) =
¡
mb,mb
¢
, then it certainly holds for other combinations of
(ml,mh). A similar line of reasoning shows that d has a strict preference for vb in
case of ω
¡
IS
¢
≤ ω∗d
¡
IS
¢
− 2, irrespective of the messages sent by l and h. QED.
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